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Book Review
LAW OF RESTITUTION. By George E. Palmer. Boston, Mass. Little.
Brown and Company, 1978. Four Volumes. pp. 2634. $180.00
MAURICE J. HOLLAND*
The appearance of this estimable work, a chef-d'oeuvre in every sense,
is an extremely welcome and important event in contemporary American
legal scholarship. Apart from the great Restatement of Restitution,' it
constitutes the first comprehensive, extended treatment of this elusive
and profound subject since the publication of Woodward's The Law of
Quasi Contracts in 1913. The Restatement was, of course, primarily in-
tended to prescribe rather than to analyze, so the unique service to this
area of law which could only be rendered by the qualified treatise writer
was clearly long overdue. Professor Palmer's qualifications are those of a
grand master, his years of writing on restitution and of teaching the sub-
ject at the University of Michigan Law School having equipped him with
the breadth of knowledge and mature soundness of judgment requisite
for success in an undertaking of the magnitude of this treatise.2 His effort
has been crowned in this work with brilliant success, and has thereby
placed all branches of the legal profession in his debt.
Practitioners may find in it both theoretical and practical grounds for
obtaining adequate recoveries for clients in situations where the ordinary
measure of damages, based upon provable loss, would render a favorable
verdict respecting liability but a hollow victory. Judges may derive from
it guidance and clarification in an area where court decisions have often
been characterized by muddle and results dubiously grounded in princi-
ple. It may, however, be among teachers and students of the law that
these volumes will have their most significant impact. They should prove
both an inspiration and a resource for renewed attention to a field of law
which, by its nature, is, in a sense, classical in its orientation towards
hard, lawyerlike analysis of exquisitely difficult fact situations.
*A.B. 1958, Yale University; M.A. 1961; J.D. 1966; L.L.M. 1970, Harvard University.
Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1(1937). Though not without its critics, among whom Professor Palmer is one, the
Restatement has been widely acclaimed and has been generally regarded as among the
most successful products of the restatement enterprise. See, e.g., Winfield, The American
Restatement of the Law of Restitution, 54 L.Q.REv. 529 (1938); Wright, Book Review, 51
HARV. L. REV. 369 (1937); and Patterson, Book Review, 47 YALE L.J. 1420 (1938).
2Only two other contemporary names come to mind as having attained comparable
eminence as restitution scholars: Professor John P. Dawson of Harvard, and Dean John
W. Wade of Vanderbilt. The latter has compiled a useful listing of important writings on
the subject: Wade, The Literature of the Law of Restitution, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1087 (1968).
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Restitution considered as a law school course should be seen as an ideal
vehicle for carrying into the second and third years the analytic and doc-
trinal focus of the first-year curriculum, and for providing a bridge
between contracts and torts on the one hand, and on the other such
advanced courses as creditors' rights, trusts, copyright, patents, unfair
competition, and the like, wherein theoretical grasp can easily be lost
sight of in the welter of intricate statutory frameworks. A restitution
course is admirably suited not only for carrying forward unifying
remedial themes from the first year, but also for rekindling among second
and third-year students the special intellectual excitement engendered by
legal study at its best, which consists of the discipline and technique of
connecting practical solutions of concrete problems with a hierarchy of
jurisprudential principles and premises; of proceeding cogently, in other
words, from the general to the particular.3
With restitutionary problems, the deductive process is all the more
challenging because of the extreme generality of the sole encompassing
principle, and the virtual absence of useful intermediate ones to afford
guidance across the chasm separating theory from specific decisions. As
formulated by the Restatement, that principle is that "[a] person who has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other." 4 Simply noting the critical adverb "unjustly"
suffices to indicate the "at-large" quality of restitution cases, for nearly
all of which this precept supplies the ultimate ratio decidend4 with prece-
dent typically availing little by way of narrowing the scope of inquiry.
The jurisprudential problem is, as with equity generally, to derive and ar-
ticulate a reasonably stable set of mediating principles, or rules, by which
to control and rationalize restitution decisions so that the latter are not
merely idiosyncratic, moralistic responses of indignant judges to the con-
duct of defendants, while at the same time avoiding such a degree of
mechanistic rule-orientation as would disable restitution from achieving
its essentially equitable goals. The problem is the more acute because
restitution, though commonly thought of as wholly remedial in character,
has, in contrast to the law of compensatory damages, a considerable
substantive scope of operation. It is concerned, not merely with deter-
mining the measure and form of plaintiff's relief, but also with defining
various occasions for relief when there exists no independent grounds for
imposing liability.5
'When, in one of his famous aphorisms, Justice Holmes observed that "[general proposi-
tions do not decide concrete cases," Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)(Holmes,
J., dissenting), he was speaking of political and economic doctrine, not legal principles. If
"concrete cases" are not decided in accordance with "general propostions" of some kind,
this must be understood to mean that less general, mediating principles or rules are needed
as well, or else the ideal of principled adjudication must be given up.
'RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION §1 (1937).
5While in the vast majority of cases a restitutionary remedy is granted to redress viola-
tion of a duty created by the law of torts, contract, or fiduciary obligation, there are some
occasions when liability is imposed solely to avoid unjust enrichment in the absence of any
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No inference is intended by what has been said that Professor Palmer
has produced a work of airy speculation or abstract philosophizing. On
the contrary, these volumes are intended for use by practitioners as well
as scholars and should prove immensely valuable to both. The analysis,
though refined and critical, is firmly rooted in the cases. The expositionis
lucid and thoughtfully organized. This is not an encyclopedic treatise on
the model of Wigmore's Evidence,6 an omnium gatherum of all leading
decisions in which one can find the law and leading authorities for every
Anglo-American jurisdiction. The Wigmore model was here wisely
eschewed, because the additional length necessitated by such extensive
footnoting would not have been worth the added cost and cluttered ap-
paratus. In many jurisdictions, the reported cases amount to little more
than a largely unconnected array of particular instances from which few
settled principles, susceptible of useful generalization, can be distilled.
Professor Palmer has supplied what the law of restitution and those
concerned with it, whether academically or professionally, sorely needed.
That is, a carefully organized, gracefully erudite, and lucidly written ex-
position of restitution doctrine and its manifold applications. Many of
those applications will open up new perspectives in remedial theory and
practice for lawyers whose only previous acquaintance with any aspect of
restitution might well have been in connection with rescission of con-
tracts.
Finally, a word of commendation is in order for the publisher of these
fine volumes for the high quality of their production. The typography and
binding are both excellent. The utility of the text is much enhanced by
tables and indices which are both complete and accurate. The collabora-
tion between author and publisher has, in this instance, obviously been a
most fortunate one.
other wrong. Apt examples of these are the mistaken conferral of a benefit and perfor-
mance under a contract discharged for impossibility.
6Le., J. WIGMORE. A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW (3d ed. 1940).
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